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Abstract 
This paper investigates and compares the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members in 
Chinese listed firms. The occupational backgrounds of independent directors and supervisory board members in listed 
firms are very different. Besides, different firms have different preferences in employing independent directors and 
supervisory board members according to their demands. Moreover, the empirical results show that characteristics of 
independent directors and supervisory board members have no clear relationship with firm performance. No matter their 
professional backgrounds or age, the independent directors and supervisory board members do not have the authority to 
affect the decision making process of management. Thus they cannot really contribute to firm performance.    
Keywords: board of directors, corporate governance, firm performance, independent directors, supervisory board 
members 
JEL-Codes: G30, G34, M51, O16, P31 
1. Introduction 
The current Chinese corporate governance framework is a result of the establishment of a modern enterprise system in 
China. With the reformation of state-owned enterprises and the fast growth of private enterprises, the Chinese 
authorities have lead all market participants to build a corporate governance system that suits China’s actual situation. 
According to the self-assessment by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (cited by OECD 2011, p.18), listed 
firms are mainly structured by the following four organs:  
“The general shareholders’ meeting is the power and decision-making organ of the company and has decision making 
power concerning major issues. The board of directors is the operational implementation organ of the company, being 
responsible to the general shareholders’ meeting, and has the decision making power concerning management issues 
under the authority of general shareholders’ meeting, set up special committees, such as strategy committee, auditing 
committee, nomination committee, remuneration and appraisal committee. The management is responsible to the board 
of directors, and is in charge of the daily operation and management of the company. The supervisory board is the 
supervision organ of the company, which supervises whether directors and managers violate laws or articles of 
association of the company when accomplishing corporate duties, and is entitled to inspect company’s finance.”  
What should be emphasized here is that, in normal listed firms, the general shareholders’ meeting nominates and selects 
the members of the directory board and supervisory board. However, due to China’s special situation, the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) also exercises great power in nominating directory board 
members and supervisory board members in state-owned listed firms.   
From the above description, it is clear that Chinese listed firms employ a two-tier board system, which includes both a board 
of directors and a supervisory board (see Figure 1). Nevertheless, different from the typical German two-tier board system, 
the Chinese Company Law (Chapter 4, Section 4, Article 123 in the revised version from 2005) regulates that listed firms 
should recruit at least one third of independent directors on their directory board. However, independent directors and 
supervisory board members have almost the same responsibilities to monitor and to advice the management in the US 
one-tier board and in the German two-tier board systems. Therefore, in China’s case, it is interesting to explore the 
differences between independent directors and supervisory board members regarding their characteristics. Further one can 
explore how much the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members affect firm performance. 
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Figure 1. The Chinese Corporate Governance Framework
1
 
It seems that the Chinese corporate governance system does not coordinate the relationship between independent 
directors and supervisory board very well. The functions of independent directors and supervisory board members are 
largely overlapping. Therefore, one can identify clearly only minor differences between them: Independent directors 
should focus more on monitoring inside directors and management. For example, they should prevent senior managers’ 
self-dealing on compensation and constrain senior managers’ power to convene board meetings and shareholders’ 
meetings. Besides, they also have the task to keep the auditing process from being controlled by inside directors and to 
ensure the fairness of party transactions. Instead, supervisory board members should supervise firms’ financial positions 
and the behavior of the senior management. If laws, regulations, firm articles and resolutions of shareholders’ meetings 
are violated, the supervisory board should protect the legitimate rights and interests of listed firms and their 
shareholders. As shown, the Chinese law and regulations only provide a vague understanding of the differences between 
independent directors and supervisory board members in listed firms. An empirical study is helpful to get a deeper 
understanding of their different characteristics and how much these characteristics can benefit listed firms. 
Most studies on Chinese corporate governance discuss the functions and the characteristics of independent directors and 
supervisory board members separately. On the one hand, academic research identifies independent directors as outsiders 
and most studies focus on effects of independency or size of the directory board on firm performance. Sometimes, age, 
gender, and educational backgrounds of independent directors are also included in these discussions (Gantenbein and 
Volonte, 2012, Erhardt et al., 2003). However, independent directors’ characteristics like occupational backgrounds are 
rarely discussed by academia. On the other hand, in most studies, the Chinese supervisory board is argued to be weak 
and to have no relationship with firm performance (Dahya et al., 2001, Tian, 2009, and Liu et al., 2010). Besides, the 
characteristics of supervisory board members have not yet received much attention from academia. Therefore, a 
comparison of the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members in Chinese listed firms is 
worthwhile. Further, although some theoretical studies have argued that both the independent directors and supervisory 
board are ineffective under China’s special institutional environment, it is necessary to provide empirical evidence. 
Firstly, this paper investigates the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members respectively. 
For example, most independent directors are scholars while most supervisory board members are current executives. 
Secondly, this paper provides a comparison of the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board 
members in different firms with different sizes, equity status and industries. It is found that different firms have different 
preferences in choosing independent directors and supervisory board members. The examined characteristics in this 
paper are the age and occupational backgrounds of independent directors and supervisory board members. Thirdly, 
using a relatively large data set, this paper makes a range of OLS regressions to test the effects of these characteristics 
on firm performance. It turns out that, in China’s case, the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory 
                                                        
1
Own figure on the basis of OECD (2011), p. 18. SASAC refers to State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission. The dashed arrow line and text box show that in state-owned firms SASAC also nominate the members of 
the directory board and the supervisory board. 
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board members do not really affect firm performance. The underlying reasons will be discussed.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main hypotheses. Section 3 provides a data 
description while section 4 summarizes statistics. In section 5, empirical analyses and results will be shown. Section 6 
includes a discussion and policy implications. 
2. Literature and Hypotheses 
In some Asian countries, scholars are one of the largest groups of independent or outside directors in listed firms. For 
example, Choi et al. (2007) find that, in Korea, 25% of firms appoint scholars as outside directors. Tan et al. (2007) 
claim that about 40% of independent directors are scholars in Chinese firms. The data sample in this paper also shows 
that 40% of independent directors are scholars. According to Liao (2009), by recruiting famous scholars firms tend to 
seek valuable advice and send out signals to the market that they wish to improve their corporate governance. On the 
one hand, most of these scholars come from business administration departments, economics departments or other 
departments that relate to the firms’ business scope. So they are supposed to provide professional advice benefiting the 
respective firms. On the other hand, famous scholars are highly respected in Asian countries. Investors and the public 
will trust listed firms more if they have famous scholars as board members. They believe that famous scholars have 
strong incentives to supervise listed firms in order to keep and improve their reputation. According to these arguments, 
the following hypotheses can be formulated: 
H1a: Scholars as independent directors have a positive impact on firm performance. 
H1b: Scholars as supervisory board members have a positive impact on firm performance. 
It is argued that outside directors with governmental work background can benefit firms due to their knowledge of 
government procedures and their insights into predicting government actions (Agrawal and Knoebe, 2001). In Japan, 
firms specialized in public projects appoint more government bureaucrats as outside directors (Miwa and Ramseyer, 
2005). According to Choi et al. (2007), Korean Chaebol firms tend to appoint executives of affiliate firms or individuals 
with political connections as outside directors. Hillman (1999) also reports that politically connected board members 
have positive and significant effects on market based firm performance. In China, it is assumed that listed firms prefer 
to have political connections in order to take advantage when borrowing from banks or receiving government 
sponsoring on preferential terms (Bai et al., 2004). This paper defines independent directors and supervisory board 
members with political connections as retired government officials.2 
H2a: Retired government officials as independent directors have a positive impact on firm performance. 
H2b: Retired government officials as supervisory board members have a positive impact on firm performance. 
Some researchers claim that professional expertise of board members can influence their understanding of business 
transactions and improve their decisions (Kesner 1988). The influence of bankers and other directors with financial 
experiences is frequently investigated by researchers. For example, Byrd et al. (2005) insist that commercial bankers 
can provide expertise for the management and enhance the access to capital. Krosner and Strahan (2001) find that 
bankers and other financial experts on corporate boards are associated with stable stock returns. Accountants and 
auditors are familiar with financial reports and the company can also benefit from their professional skills. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) suggest that large firms and firms with higher environmental regulation costs tend to recruit more 
lawyers as directors. All of the examples indicate that listed firms will recruit independent directors and supervisory 
board members with special professional backgrounds to improve firm performance.  
H3a: Independent directors with professional background in specific fields have a positive impact on firm performance. 
H3b: Supervisory board members with professional background in specific fields have a positive impact on firm 
performance. 
Executives have outstanding authority and experience that are well suited for monitoring and advising the management. 
For example, outside CEOs are appointed by firms in order to benefit from their reputation and to assure the public that 
the firm is doing well (Fahlenbrach, 2009). Executives themselves also prefer to serve as independent directors and 
supervisory board members in other firms in order to build additional networks and to enhance prestige. Brickley et al. 
(1999) also demonstrate that by appointing former executives as directors, firms are more likely to have a good 
accounting performance. In this paper, executives refer to former executives and current ones.  
                                                        
2
Some researches argue that directors who have a party membership can be considered as having a political background. 
This might be too general. It is sure that directors with political backgrounds have party memberships but not all party 
members have a political background. However, those who have worked in a government organization definitely have a 
political background. 
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H4a: Executives as independent directors have a positive impact on firm performances. 
H4b: Executives as supervisory board members have a positive impact on listed firms. 
There are different opinions on the effect of age on firm performance. Some scholars argue that older board members 
might benefit the firm because of more business experience. Others insist that younger board members are more 
beneficial. Rose (2005) reports that boards having a younger average age outperform older boards. The explanation for 
younger boards’ superior firm performance is that the age of the directors may influence the risks and decisions they 
pursue. For example, Zajac and Westphal (1996) suggest that the age of individuals could affect their openness to new 
ideas. Younger directors may be more willing to take risks and be more innovative (Hambrick et al., 1984, Grimm et al., 
1991). Although younger directors have less experience, they have superior technical knowledge resulting from better 
and fresher education (Bantel et al., 1989). This paper agrees with the latter opinion that younger independent directors 
and supervisory board members are more efficient.  
H5a: Younger independent directors have a positive impact on firm performance. 
H5b: Younger supervisory board members have a positive impact on firm performance. 
3. Data Description 
In this paper, the SSE (Shanghai Stock Exchange) 180 Index Companies are used as sample data.3 Some firms in the 
financial sector (banks, insurance companies, security companies and other financial firms) are excluded because of 
their different disclosure requirements in China. Finally, there are 151 firms left in the data set. Most of the financial 
data and all characteristics information of independent directors and supervisory board members are collected from the 
firms’ annual reports. One year stock return is collected from Bloomberg. Industry data is collected from the website of 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. All collected data is derived from the financial year 2011.  
3.1 Dependent Variables 
Firm performance is measured in many ways in the existing literature. In this paper, ROE (return on equity) is used as 
accounting measurement while Rtn (one year stock return) is used as a market measure to represent firm performance. 
ROE equals a fiscal year’s after-tax income divided by total equity. Rtn is the percentage of stock market return for the 
last year. EPS (earnings per share) will be used to check the robustness of the regression results. It is calculated as net 
income minus dividends on preferred stock and then divided by average outstanding shares. 
3.2 Independent Variables 
3.2.1 Variables of Interest 
Based on previous literature and the specific situation in the Chinese corporate governance system, this paper collects 
11 characteristics of independent directors (see Table 1) and 15 characteristics of supervisory board members (see Table 
2). Compared to independent directors, 4 additional characteristics of supervisory board members are collected. They 
are insiders, outsiders, union representatives and party representatives.  
Insiders and outsiders are selected because the Chinese company law regulates that listed firms should recruit one third 
of employee representatives on the supervisory board. However, how much outsiders should be on the supervisory 
board is not clearly stated by the law. It is possible that the Chinese supervisory board is insider-controlled. So it makes 
sense to investigate this situation. 
The other two variables, union representatives and communist party representatives, are typical in China’s situation 
concerning supervisory board members. Before the corporate reforms, unions and party affiliations played very 
important roles in supervising state-owned enterprises. Since the early 1990s, when the western corporate governance 
mechanism has been introduced to China, these two groups have gradually lost their importance. However, at present, 
there still exist many of them in state-owned enterprises and in some companies that used to be state-owned enterprises. 
Moreover, in these firms, union and party representatives normally occupy seats on the supervisory board. So it is 
necessary to put these two variables into the study. In this paper, the variable union representatives refers to the 
chairman or vice chairman of the union. The variable communist party representatives refers to the secretary or vice 
secretary of the party affiliations. They are also counted as occupations. 
 
 
                                                        
3
 The list of SSE 180 index companies were extracted from the website of Shanghai Stock Exchanges on September 
2012. Every six months, the SSE 180 index companies will be changed. The link is 
http://www.sse.com.cn/market/sseindex/indexlist/s/i000010/const_list.shtml to the Chinese website. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics for Independent Directors 
Definition of variables Mean Median Min Max S.D. 
Dependent Variables      
Return on equity (%) (ROE) 16.90 14.52 -25.34 84.67 13.56 
Annual stock return (%) (Rtn) 1.57 -5.95 -45.93 173.29 36.62 
Earnings per share (EPS) 0.77 0.51 -1.02 8.44 0.91 
Independent Variables      
Age 56.32 55.33 40.66 68.60 6.03 
Scholars (%) 40.10 33.33 0.00 100.00 30.01 
Accountants (%) 14.36 00.0 0.00 66.67 17.10 
Retired government officials (%) 10.80 0.00 0.00 100.00 18.37 
Current executives (%) 10.58 0.00 0.00 66.67 18.04 
Lawyers (%) 8.13 0.00 0.00 66.67 13.79 
Former executives (%) 5.60 0.00 0.00 66.67 13.12 
Commercial bankers (%) 0.92 0.00 0.00 33.33 5.17 
Auditors (%) 0.52 0.00 0.00 33.33 3.74 
Consultants (%) 0.35 0.00 0.00 33.33 3.15 
Others (%) 8.64 0.00 0.00 66.67 15.47 
Control Variables      
Firm size 30655.11 9185.00 53.00 552810.00 66800.22 
Log (Firm size) 9.05 9.13 3.97 13.22 1.76 
Debt ratio (%) 54.08 55.40 7.82 85.46 17.59 
Directory board size 10.12 9.00 5.00 18.00 2.49 
Board independence (%) 38.52 36.36 27.78 75.00 8.28 
Supervisory board size 4.56 5.00 3.00 11.00 1.68 
Industry     
Largest shareholder is state 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 
Top 5 shareholders include 
foreign shareholders 
0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
Note: The table presents the mean, median, minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values as well as standard deviation 
(S.D.) for each variable. The variables scholars, accountants, retired government officials, current executives, lawyers, 
former executives, commercial bankers, auditors, consultants and others are calculated as their numbers on boards 
divided by the total number of independent directors and then multiplied by 100. The variable board independence is 
calculated as the number of independent directors divided by the directory board size and then multiplied by 100. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics for Supervisory Board Members 
Definition of variables Mean Median Min Max S.D. 
Dependent Variables      
Return on equity (%) (ROE) 16.90 14.52 -25.34 84.67 13.56 
Annual stock return (%) (Rtn) 1.57 -5.95 -45.93 173.29 36.62 
Earnings per share (EPS) 0.77 0.51 -1.02 8.44 0.91 
Independent Variables      
Age 48.75 49.33 34.00 62.40 4.75 
Current executives (%) 31.11 33.33 0.00 100.00 29.08 
Accountants (%) 15.95 14.29 0.00 100.00 18.33 
Party representatives (%) 15.17 11.11 0.00 100.00 21.51 
Union representatives (%) 8.20 16.67 0.00 66.67 12.94 
Auditors (%) 7.01 0.00 0.00 40.00 11.72 
Retired government officials 
(%) 
3.12 0.00 0.00 40.00 9.11 
Former executives (%) 2.13 0.00 0.00 66.67 8.50 
Scholars (%) 1.11 0.00 0.00 37.50 5.50 
Lawyers (%) 1.11 0.00 0.00 20.00 4.27 
Commercial bankers (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Consultants (%) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Others (%) 15.10 0.00 0.00 100.00 21.51 
Insiders (%) 93.71 100.00 33.33 100.00 13.90 
Outsiders (%) 6.29 0.00 0.00 66.67 13.63 
Control Variables      
Firm size 30655.11 9185.00 53.00 552810.00 66800.22 
Log (Firm size) 9.05 9.13 3.97 13.22 1.76 
Debt ratio (%) 54.08 55.40 7.82 85.46 17.59 
Directory board size 10.12 9.00 5.00 18.00 2.49 
Board independence (%) 38.52 36.36 27.78 75.00 8.28 
Supervisory board size 4.56 5.00 3.00 11.00 1.68 
Industry      
Largest shareholder is state 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.44 
Top 5 shareholders include 
foreign shareholders 
0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
Note: The table presents the mean, median, minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values as well as standard deviation 
(S.D.) for each variable. The variables: current executives, accountants, party representatives, union representatives, 
auditors, retired government officials, former executives, scholars, lawyers, commercial banker, consultants, and others 
are calculated as their numbers on boards divided by the total number of independent directors and then multiplied by 
100. 
3.2.2 Control Variables 
Apart from the variables of primary interest, this paper also controls for listed firms’ characteristics and their 
governance characteristics which are expected to influence firm performance. Firms’ characteristics are firm size, debt 
ratio, industry, and the equity status of listed firms. The governance characteristics are directory board size, supervisory 
board size, and board independence respectively. Two dummy variables are used to reflect the equity status of firms. 
The variable largest shareholder is state equals 1 if the firm’s largest shareholder is the state, otherwise it equals 0. The 
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variable top 5 shareholders include foreign shareholders equals 1 if one or several of the firm’s top 5 largest 
shareholders are foreign shareholders, otherwise it equals 0. Moreover, the number of employees represents the firm 
size. The variable log (firm size) is the log function of firm size. Instead of firm size, log (firm size) is used in the 
regressions to deal with skewness. Board independence is the percentage of independent directors in the board of 
directors. The variable industry includes 9 industries in accordance to GICS (global industry classification standard).  
4. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide the summary data of characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board 
members. Firstly, the average age of the supervisory board members is lower than of the independent directors (48.75 vs. 
56.32). Secondly, the occupational composition of independent directors and supervisory board members are very 
different. Thirdly, the board independency and the supervisory board size in Chinese listed firms are much smaller than 
in the USA or Germany.  
Table 1 presents the summary of independent directors’ characteristics. The top 5 main occupations are scholars 
(40.10%), accountants (14.36%), retired government officials (10.80%), current executives (10.58%) and lawyers 
(8.13%). Surprisingly, in Chinese listed firms, commercial bankers, auditors, and consultants account for very small 
percentages among independent directors with 0.92%, 0.52% and 0.35% respectively. Table 2 contains a summary of 
supervisory board members’ characteristics. The top 5 main occupations of supervisory board members are very 
different. They are current executives (31.11%), accountants (15.95%), party representatives (15.17%), union 
representatives (8.20%) and auditors (7.01%), whereas scholars and lawyers only have a few percentages on the 
supervisory board, about 1.11% for each. Moreover, commercial bankers and consultants are not at all on Chinese 
supervisory boards although they are main components on either supervisory board or as independent directors in 
western countries. Lastly, accountants is the only variable that has very little percentage difference in independent 
directors and on supervisory boards (14.36% vs. 15.95%).  
The average number on the board of directors is 10.12 and board independence is 38.52%. The size of the board of 
directors in China is smaller than the average US board of directors and the Chinese board independency is lower.4 In 
this context, the lower board independency illustrates that the Chinese board of directors may have an insider-control 
problem. The percentage 38.52% is only a little bit higher than prescribed 33.33%, which indicates that listed firms may 
have independent directors just to satisfy CSRC’ regulations. The average number of supervisory board members is 4.56, 
which is also only a little bit more than the provisions of the Chinese Company Law (which regulates that the 
supervisory board should have at least 3 members). Compared to German supervisory boards, Chinese supervisory 
boards are much smaller.5 Moreover, on the supervisory board, insiders have a percentage of 93.71%, which indicates 
that the Chinese supervisory board also suffers from an insider-control problem. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the occupations of independent directors and supervisory board members in firms with 
different sizes and equity status. In most of the cases, it can be seen that large firms and state-owned firms have similar 
preferences while small firms and non-state-owned firms have other but between them also quite similar preferences in 
selecting both independent directors and supervisory board members.  
Table 3 shows that large firms and state-owned firms employ less scholars as independent directors than small firms and 
non-state-owned firms (32.50% and 37.45% vs. 38.29% and 47.98%). This indicates that small firms and 
non-state-owned firms tend to have more scholars as independent directors in order to impress the public and investors 
respectively. Moreover, in large firms and state-owned firms, there are nearly 3 times more retired government officials 
that serve as independent directors than in small firms and non-state-owned firms. This is consistent with China’s 
institutional situation, in which large firms and state-owned firms have stronger political connections. Besides, former 
executives as independent directors account for higher percentages in large firms and state-owned firms. In contrast, 
current executives have lower percentages in large firms and state-owned firms.  
 
 
 
                                                        
4
 According to an investigation by Fortune magazine, in the top 1.000 US firms the average board scale is 11. 
Normally, independent directors occupy 9 of the seats (board independency is more than 80%) on the board of 
directors. 
5
 Depending on the number of employees, the size of the supervisory board is by German law at least 12, 16, or 20 for 
companies with domestic employment ranging from 2,000 to less than 10,000, 10,000 to less than 20,000 and more than 
20,000 respectively. 
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Table 3. Data Description of Independent Directors’ Characteristics (classified by firm size and equity status) 
 Scholars 
Commercial 
bankers 
Retired 
government 
officials 
Accountants Auditors 
By firm size      
Large firms ( ≥ p75) 32.50 1.40 15.97 13.99 0.53 
Small firms (≤ p25) 38.29 0.53 5.70 17.59 0.00 
By equity status      
State-owned firms 37.45 0.65 12.94 13.63 0.69 
Non-state-owned firms 47.98 1.75 4.43 16.54 0.00 
 Lawyers 
Former 
executives 
Current 
executives 
Consultants Others 
By firm size      
Large firms ( ≥ p75) 4.77 8.62 13.20 0.88 8.14 
Small firms (≤ p25) 10.35 3.80 14.90 0.00 8.86 
By equity status      
State-owned firms 8.58 6.56 10.27 0.47 8.75 
Non-state-owned firms 6.80 2.72 11.49 0.00 8.29 
Note: Here large firms refer to those whose firm size ≥ p75 and small firms refer to those whose firm size ≤ p25. All the 
given data is the mean value and is measured by percentage. 
Table 4 presents the occupations of supervisory board members in firms with different sizes and equity status. For 
scholars, retired government officials and current executives, similar rules are applied in choosing supervisory board 
members by large firms and state-owned firms on the one hand and small firms and non-state-owned firms on the other 
hand. For example, the percentages of scholars as supervisory board members in large firms and state-owned firms are 
larger than in small firms and non-state-owned firms (2.13% and 1.19% vs. 0.88% and 0.89%). This means small firms 
and non-state-owned firms need more scholars as supervisory board members to convince the public. However, it is 
found that there are more former executives on the supervisory board in small firms and non-state-owned firms. Taking 
into consideration that most of these small firms and non-state-owned firms are family business, the discussed results 
make a lot of sense. In most occasions, former executives are also the founders of these firms, indicating that small 
firms and non-state-owned firms might suffer more from the insider-control problem.  
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Table 4. Data Description of Supervisory Board Members’ Characteristics (classified by firm size and equity status) 
 Scholars 
Commercial 
bankers 
Retired 
government 
officials 
Accountants Auditors 
By firm size      
Large firms (≥ p75) 2.13 0.00 5.54 15.82 7.19 
Small firms (≤ p25) 0.88 0.00 2.28 17.37 4.65 
By equity status      
State-owned firms 1.19 0.00 3.70 16.14 7.48 
Non-state-owned firms 0.89 0.00 1.40 15.35 5.61 
 Lawyers 
Former 
executives 
Current 
executives 
Consultants Others 
By firm size      
Large firms (≥ p75) 1.85 1.97 20.40 0.00 13.38 
Small firms (≤ p25) 0.00 2.63 41.97 0.00 16.44 
By equity status      
State-owned firms 1.30 1.67 26.32 0.00 14.28 
Non-state-owned firms 0.52 3.51 45.35 0.00 17.54 
 
Union 
representative
s 
Party 
representatives 
Insiders Outsiders  
By firm size      
Large firms (≥ p75) 12.22 19.49 93.12 6.44 
 
Small firms (≤ p25) 3.20 10.57 95.43 3.68 
By equity status      
State-owned firms 9.83 18.09 93.95 5.39 
 
Non-state-owned firms 3.33 6.49 92.98 7.02 
Note: Here large firms refer to those whose firm size ≥ p75 and small firms refer to those whose firm size ≤ p25. All the 
given data is the mean value and is measured by percentage. 
Table 5 and Table 6 present the occupations of independent directors and supervisory board members in different 
industries. In most occasions firms in traditional industries have similar preferences while firms in emerging industries 
have other similar preferences in recruiting both independent directors and supervisory board members. To simplify the 
description, the following two paragraphs will describe the results of both the energy and technology industries as 
representative for traditional and emerging industries. 
Table 5 shows that firms in the energy industry (38.64%) choose less scholars as independent directors than firms in the 
information industry (46.88%). This indicates that firms in emerging industries tend to recruit more scholars as 
independent directors in order to show to the public that they have better firm performance. Besides, firms in the energy 
industry choose nearly 5 times more retired government officials as independent directors than firms in the information 
industry. This shows that firms in traditional industries have stronger political connections. Moreover, former executives 
in the energy industry (9.70%) account for a larger percentage than in the information industry (0.00%). However, 
current executives have similar percentages (9.70% vs. 8.33%) in both industries.  
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Table 5. Data Description of Independent Directors’ Characteristics (classified by industry) 
 Scholars 
Commercial 
bankers 
Retired 
government 
officials 
Accountants Auditors 
By industry      
Energy 38.64 0.00 16.67 10.76 0.00 
Materials 37.96 0.00 9.72 18.06 0.00 
Industrials 35.89 1.73 11.49 12.75 0.90 
Consumer 
discretionary 
43.10 0.00 15.38 16.59 0.00 
Consumer staples 58.33 0.00 6.25 10.42 0.00 
Health care 61.90 0.00 13.10 16.67 0.00 
Financials 37.88 1.52 3.79 15.08 0.00 
Information 
technology 
46.88 0.00 3.13 22.92 0.00 
Utilities 35.78 1.33 18.56 10.44 2.22 
 Lawyers 
Former 
executives 
Current executives Consultants Others 
By industry      
Energy 9.70 9.70 9.70 0.00 4.85 
Materials 7.87 3.70 10.65 0.00 12.04 
Industrials 7.25 8.09 9.65 1.07 11.19 
Consumer 
discretionary 
5.30 0.00 16.59 0.00 3.03 
Consumer staples 7.29 0.00 11.46 0.00 6.25 
Health care 8.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Financials 11.21 3.75 13.75 0.00 13.03 
Information 
technology 
18.75 0.00 8.33 0.00 0.00 
Utilities 3.00 10.11 11.56 0.00 7.00 
Note: The variable industry covers 9 industries in accordance with GICS (global industry classification standard). All 
the given data is the mean value and is measured by percentage. 
Table 6 shows the occupations of supervisory board members in different industries. Former executives have a larger 
percentage in information firms (7.74%) than in energy firms (4.85%). Current executives are also two times more 
common in information firms than in energy firms (42.41% vs.17.35%). This indicates that firms in emerging industries 
suffer more from the insider-control problem. 
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Table 6. Data Description of Supervisory Board Members’ Characteristics (classified by industry) 
 Scholars Commercial bankers 
Retired 
government 
officials 
Accountants Auditors 
By industry      
Energy 3.03 0.00 2.27 17.64 6.69 
Materials 0.00 0.00 6.30 21.74 3.95 
Industrials 1.73 0.00 1.43 13.82 10.19 
Consumer 
discretionary 
0.00 0.00 3.64 9.70 6.06 
Consumer staples 1.79 0.00 5.95 18.45 4.17 
Health care 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.38 9.52 
Financials 0.00 0.00 3.94 17.05 6.97 
Information 
technology 
4.17 0.00 0.00 21.58 0.00 
Utilities 0.00 0.00 5.84 16.19 5.62 
 Lawyers Former executives 
Current 
executives 
Consultants Others 
By industry      
Energy 2.15 4.85 17.35 0.00 24.72 
Materials 0.69 2.00 17.84 0.00 26.57 
Industrials 1.20 0.67 31.59 0.00 10.10 
Consumer 
discretionary 
1.52 0.00 24.54 0.00 20.30 
Consumer staples 4.29 4.17 32.86 0.00 4.17 
Health care 0.00 0.00 51.43 0.00 4.76 
Financials 0.91 3.94 42.05 0.00 18.03 
Information 
technology 
0.00 7.74 42.41 0.00 12.20 
Utilities 0.00 1.11 25.90 0.00 13.40 
 
Union 
representatives 
Party representatives Insiders Outsiders  
By industry      
Energy 13.92 7.37 95.83 4.17 
 
Materials 6.30 14.61 96.54 3.46 
Industrials 9.24 20.04 90.98 9.02 
Consumer 
discretionary 
15.45 18.79 96.36 3.64 
Consumer staples 2.50 21.67 87.98 12.02 
Health care 12.38 9.52 92.38 7.62 
Financials 1.14 5.98 95.45 4.55 
Information 
technology 
3.87 8.04 100.00 0.00 
Utilities 11.79 20.14 93.22 6.78  
Note: The variable industry included 9 industries in accordance with GICS (global industry classification standard). All 
the given data is the mean value and is measured by percentage. 
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5. Empirical Results 
Before the regression analysis, Pearson’s correlations were calculated to see whether there are high correlations (≥0.7) 
between the variables. The variables insiders and supervisory board size have a correlation of 0.90. However, the two 
variables are not studied in the same regression model. Therefore, the high correlation will not be a problem for the 
following empirical study. A correlation matrix is not presented in this paper but can be sent on demand. Other tests are 
also carried out to detect whether there are multicollinearity problems. Some of the variance inflations factors (vif) are 
much larger than 10. This indicates that some variables will create problems if they are in the same regression model. 
Due to this problem, some variables are deleted in the regression models in order to ensure the reliability of the 
regressions. The details will be introduced in the next paragraphs.  
In this section, OLS regressions will be used to examine the effects of the characteristics of independent directors and 
supervisory board members on firm performance. ROE and Rtn are chosen as dependent variables that represent 
accounting and market measurements of firm performance. EPS will be used as dependent variable to test the 
robustness of the results. This paper suffers difficulties in choosing independent variables in the regression steps. Not all 
variables can be used but the following six independent variables have been chosen for the regression analysis: age (and 
age²), scholars, retired government officials, accountants, former executives and current executives. This is due to the 
fact that the high variance inflations factors (≥10) of some variables could create multicollinearity problems, especially 
for variables with very low values such as commercial bankers (0.92%), consultants (0.35%), auditors (0.52%) and 
lawyers (1.11%). Their low values also show that these are not important occupations of independent directors and 
supervisory board members in Chinese listed firms. Furthermore, party representatives and union representatives will 
not be included in the comparison analysis. Only characteristics that both independent directors and supervisory board 
members have are analyzed.  
Table 7 shows the effects of characteristics of independent directors on firm performance. In model 1, only the variables 
that are of primary interest in this paper are included. It turns out that all the characteristics have no significant effects 
on ROE. However, in this model, R2 is rather low, which indicates that these variables in model 1 are not the main 
factors that affect ROE. Therefore, in the next regression step, the control variables are added into model 2. As a result, 
R2 is relatively larger compared to model 1. Nevertheless, the results have not really improved. Except for the 
significantly positive effect of the accountants (at the level of 0.10), all other variables still have no significant effect on 
ROE. Further, the same is done for Rtn in model 3 and model 4. Unfortunately, there are no significant effects at all, 
even the significant effect of accountants has disappeared. Finally, EPS is used as dependent variable to test the 
robustness of the results. There are a few significant effects in model 5 and model 6, for example the control variable 
debt ratio has a significant effect on EPS, but most of the results are consistent with the results in model 1 to 4. To sum 
up, the regression results show that the characteristics of independent directors have no strong relations to firm 
performance. 
Table 8 presents the effects of characteristics of supervisory board members on firm performance. Model 1 and model 2 
show that the ratio of scholars has a significant negative effect on ROE (at the level of 5%). However, this significant 
effect disappears in model 3 and model 4 when Rtn is used as the dependent variable. Other variables are found to have 
no highly significant effects on firm performance from model 1 to model 4. Model 5 and model 6 use EPS as dependent 
variable to test the robustness of the results. They also show that none of the independent variables have highly 
significant effects on EPS except for the control variable debt ratio which has a significantly negative effect. In sum, the 
characteristics of supervisory board members also have no strong relations to firm performance. 
The empirical results show that the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members do not really 
affect firm performance in Chinese listed firms. From an empirical point of view, the insignificant results in this paper maybe 
due to one of the following reasons. Empirical studies on the effects of directors’ characteristics often have conflicting 
conclusions. On the one hand, the characteristics of directors are not the main determinants of firm performance. Studies 
choosing different kinds of measurements of firm performance normally obtained different results even if they studied the 
same characteristics. For example, Byrd et al. (2005) find that bankers have negative effects on debt ratios while Stearns and 
Mizruchi (1993) discover that the presence of bankers is positively associated with firms’ short term borrowing. On the other 
hand, the definitions of the characteristics of the directors can vary. In this paper, the definitions of western countries are used 
which might not suit China’s situation. This might create a bias of the results. Another explanation could be that some 
characteristics of directors might be sensitive to only certain measures of firm performance. For a study which explores a 
variety of characteristics, it would be difficult to find a certain measurement that is sensitive for each characteristic. Finally, 
independent directors, supervisory board members and their characteristics could just be not that important in China. 
 
 
Business and Management Studies                                                                Vol. 2, No. 3; 2016 
39 
 
Table 7. Effects of Characteristics of Independent Directors on Firm Performance 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables (for independent directors) 
ROE Rtn EPS 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Age 
3.6862 
(1.22) 
3.5173 
(1.06) 
-1.1543 
(-0.13) 
-3.8720 
(-0.43) 
0.3322 
(1.61) 
0.2780  
(1.29) 
Age² 
-0.3758 
(-1.44) 
-0.0373 
(-1.28) 
0.0046 
(0.06) 
0.0299 
(0.38) 
-0.0032*  
(-1.77) 
-0.0027 
(-1.42) 
Scholars 
0.0246 
(0.45) 
0.0402 
(0.66) 
0.0926 
(0.58) 
0.0851 
(0.52) 
0.0009 
(0.25) 
0.0006 
 (0.17) 
Accountants 
0.1167 
(1.54) 
0.1401* 
(1,64) 
0.0397 
(0.18) 
-0.1378 
(-0.60) 
0.0097* 
(1.88) 
0.0093* 
(1.68) 
Retired government 
officials 
0.0404 
(0.55) 
0.8719 
(1.04) 
-0.0953 
(-0.44) 
-0.0633 
(-0.28) 
0.0092* 
(1.83) 
0.0103* 
(1.90) 
Current executives 
-0.1157 
(-1.62) 
-0.1122 
(-1.41) 
-0.0085 
(-0.04) 
-0.0476 
(-0.22) 
-0.0040 
(-0.81) 
-0.0016 
(-0.30) 
Former executives 
-0.0074 
(-0.08) 
0.0407 
(0.37) 
-0.1146 
(-0.41) 
-0.0538 
(-0.18) 
-0.0021 
(-0.31) 
0.0030 
 (0.41) 
Log (firm size)  
0.0132 
(0.01) 
 
0.4544 
(0.18) 
 
0.5361  
(0.89) 
Debt ratio  
-0.0016 
(-0.02) 
 
0.0578 
(0.28) 
 
-0.0098**  
(-1.97) 
Directory board size  
-0.0592 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.5360 
(-0.25) 
 
0.0494  
(0.96) 
Board independence  
-0.5291 
(-0.03) 
 
-0.7143 
(-0.01) 
 
-0.1258 
(-1.09) 
Supervisory board size  
-0.1284 
(-0.15) 
 
-3.7084 
(-1.58) 
 
-0.0210 
(-0.39) 
Largest shareholder is 
state 
 
-2.0006 
(-0.64) 
 
-2.5101 
(-0.30) 
 
0.1526  
(0.75) 
Top 5 shareholders 
include foreign 
shareholders 
 
-3.0870 
(-0.93) 
 
-3.0015 
(-0.34) 
 
-0.2573 
(-0.12) 
_cons 
-71.9854  
(-0.84) 
-60.0715  
(-0.64) 
49.1811 
(0.20) 
141.2771 
(0.56) 
-7.8506  
(-1.35) 
-6.5049 
(-1.07) 
Industry  included  included  included 
Number of obs. 151 147 146 142 151 147 
Prob. > F 0.0086 0.1354 0.6262 0.8912 0.0338 0.1820 
R2 0.1216 0.1706 0.0369 0.2026 0.0991 0.2165 
Root MSE 13.012 13.58 36.839 36.144 0.8850 0.8822 
Note: Six models are designed to test the hypotheses. Models 1, 3, 5 are without additional control variables while 
models 2, 4, 6 include them. Stata makes a F-test with nine industries such that it does not provide the coefficient of 
industry. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed).  
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Table 8. Effects of Characteristics of Supervisory Board Members on Firm Performance 
Independent variables 
Dependent variables (for supervisory board members) 
ROE Rtn EPS 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Age 
-0.9177 
(-0.29) 
0.6328 
(0.17) 
0.0768 
(0.01) 
3.4619 
(0.35) 
0.1357 
(0.63) 
0.0490 
(0.21) 
Age² 
0.0093 
(0.28) 
-0.0059 
(-0.15) 
-0.0102 
(-0.11) 
-0.0409 
(-0.40) 
-0.0013 
(-0.59) 
-0.0005 
(-0.22) 
Current executives 
0.0068 
(0.16) 
0.0007 
(0.01) 
0.0247 
(0.21) 
-0.0273 
(-0.20) 
-0.0009 
(-0.32) 
-0.0014 
(-0.45) 
Accountants 
0.0650 
(1.01) 
0.0483 
(0.67) 
-0.0968 
(-0.54) 
-0.1617 
(-0.84) 
0.0042 
(0.95) 
0.0029 
(0.64) 
Retired government 
officials 
-0.1604 
(-1.22) 
-0.2500* 
(-1.71) 
0.4466 
(1.23) 
0.4748 
(1.23) 
-0.0097 
(-1.08) 
-0.0173*  
(-1.85) 
Former executives 
-0.0098 
(-0.07) 
-0.0555 
(-0.36) 
-0.5034 
(-1.36) 
-0.8855**  
(-2.17) 
-0.0055 
(-0.60) 
-0.0096 
(-0.98) 
Scholars 
-0.4756**  
(-2.34) 
-0.4812** 
(-2.19) 
-0.2143 
(-0.39) 
-0.2800 
(-0.48) 
-0.0193 
(-1.40) 
-0.0174 
(-1.24) 
Log (firm size)  
-0.1879 
(0.18) 
 
0.7488 
(0.28) 
 
0.0852 
(1.33) 
Debt ratio  
-0.0135 
(-0,17) 
 
0.0855 
(0.41) 
 
-0.0097**  
(-1.97) 
Directory board size  
0.8254 
(1.09) 
 
0.3938 
(0.19) 
 
0.0671 
(1.40) 
Board independence  
-2.5771 
(-1.05) 
 
-5.2421 
(-0.14) 
 
-0.1882*  
(-1.72) 
Supervisory board 
size 
 
0.1191 
(0.14) 
 
-1.0780 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.0105 
(-0.19) 
Largest shareholder is 
state 
 
1.0394 
(-0.30) 
 
-0.1346 
(-0.01) 
 
0.2295 
(1.05) 
Top 5 shareholders 
include foreign 
shareholders 
 
-3.2439 
(-0.93) 
 
-2.0051 
(-0.21) 
 
0.0039 
(0.02) 
_cons 
39.1993 
(0.52) 
1.9258 
(0.02) 
22.9964 
(0.11) 
-54.2053 
(-0.23) 
-2.6604 
(-0.52) 
-0.5802 
(-0.11) 
Industry  included  included  included 
Number of obs. 151 147 146 142 151 147 
Prob. > F 0.2453 0.5284 0.6076 0.71719 0.5986 0.2866 
R2 0.0607 0.1252 0.0379 0.1660 0.0371 0.2035 
Root MSE 13.456 13.947 36.819 36.785 0.9149 0.8895 
Note: Six models are designed to test the hypotheses. Models 1, 3, 5 are without additional control variables while 
models 2, 4, 6 include them. Stata makes a F-test with nine industries such that it does not provide the coefficient of 
industry. The t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels (two-tailed).  
Therefore, in China’s situation the empirical results might be reasonable. On the one hand, in China’s special situation 
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underlying political causes should be considered. For example, in some state-owned listed firms the government 
authority SASAC also has great power in nominating the members of the directory and supervisory board. In this case 
there would be other more important selecting standards than considering the professional backgrounds or age. As a 
result, the characteristics of independent directors and supervisory board members might affect firm performance less. 
On the other hand, most studies on Chinese independent directors or on supervisory boards insist that these are more or 
less only decorations in most occasions (Dahya et al., 2001, Bai, 2004). If independent directors and supervisory boards 
are ineffective in Chinese listed firms, it means that independent from their professional backgrounds or age 
independent directors and supervisory board members do not have the authority to affect the decision making process of 
management. Thus, they cannot really contribute to the firm performance. This is discussed more thoroughly in the next 
section.  
6. Discussion and Policy Implications 
As previously discussed, many scholars argue that independent directors in Chinese listed firms have failed to play a 
substantive role in the corporate governance system. This is mainly due to the following considerations. Firstly, the 
serious insider-control problem in listed firms makes it difficult for independent directors to stay truly independent. 
Normally, the shareholders choose the independent directors whereas in most Chinese listed firms independent directors 
are chosen by the management. Under this situation, independent directors tend to compromise to please the 
management. Secondly, the percentage of independent directors is too low to challenge the inside directors. Whether to 
take their advice or not does not depend on the institutional constrains but depends on the consciousness of the insiders 
themselves. Thirdly, in Chinese listed firms, most independent directors are scholars instead of managers. Thus they 
may not have a full understanding about the business of listed firms. Some of them even work for several listed firms, 
which scatters their energies. Fourth, there is no sound human resource market for independent directors in China, 
which means professional independent directors are still scarce resources. Also, most independent directors have not yet 
built their own reputations. Furthermore, the lack of training mechanism exacerbates the problem. Thus it is possible 
that independent directors may choose to remain passive. 
In China, the establishment of supervisory boards in listed firms is regarded as an innovation of the modern enterprise 
system. The initial intention was to learn from the experience of the supervisory board in the German and Japanese 
corporate governance systems. However, the simple adoption of a foreign system does not seem to work due to the 
following reasons. Firstly, it is difficult for supervisory board members to perform their duties. The Chinese Company 
Law regulates that at least one third of the supervisory board members have to be employee representative. However, 
the data show that most of those employee representatives are from senior leaderships of the union and the party 
affiliations. They may also belong to the senior management in the company, which makes it difficult to conduct 
self-monitoring. Even if the employee representatives are ordinary employees, they do not dare to supervise their 
managers or to point out the problems because the management controls their jobs and salaries. Secondly, since 
independent directors are introduced into listed firms, the functions of the supervisory board have become more and 
more unclear. Independent directors and some special committees (such as the audit committee) are also given the 
duties to supervise and advice management. The unclear division of the tasks must create some sort of inefficiency and 
futility. 
It might be possible that some Chinese listed firms recruit independent directors or supervisory board members only to 
response to or meet the government’s requirement of building a modern enterprise system. However, this is against the 
policy makers’ initial intention to improve the corporate governance by introducing independent directors and 
supervisory boards. In order to change the situation, policy makers should firstly coordinate the functional conflicts 
between independent directors and the supervisory board. At present, some popular proposals insist that the supervisory 
board should supervise the financial and audit statements while independent directors should be in charge of strategic 
advising, nomination and remuneration. It has to be emphasized that all duties have to be clearly defined and divided by 
law and regulations. Secondly, the independence of the supervisory board should also be improved since insiders are not 
efficient in monitoring the management. Thirdly, professional training mechanisms of independent directors and 
supervisory board members could be established to help them improve their sense of duty. Fourthly, an appropriate 
insurance system should be introduced to protect the rights of independent directors and supervisory board members. 
Only under this protection they can really challenge the management with little concern for themselves.  
However, these measures are only palliatives. The Chinese corporate structure should be simplified instead of adding 
too many components. At present, independent supervisory board members are also introduced, which only makes the 
firm structure even more complicated. For example, there will be problems to clarify the relations between independent 
directors and independent supervisory board members. A better solution is to repeal the overlapping mechanisms and to 
give the listed firms rights to choose the corporate governance structures that suit their own situations. Only a corporate 
governance system that is based on firms’ demands and those of their shareholders and other important stakeholders can 
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be efficient. However, at present, the dominance of big shareholders in Chinese listed firms does not allow the 
implementation of the suggested solution because the small shareholders’ rights cannot be well ensured. Chinese listed 
firms still need appropriate policy interventions.  
This paper has also some other limitations, which could provide some directions for further research. Firstly, this paper 
only uses the data in the firm year 2011. Further research could use a panel data set to test the robustness of the results. 
Secondly, all the SSE 180 index companies are quality-listed firms, which do not represent all the listed firms in China. 
Small and medium-sized listed firms should also be investigated. 
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